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Abstract In this paper, we analyze under which conditions a self-supporting insur-
ance guaranty fund can be beneficial for the policyholders in an incomplete mar-
ket. Within the analyzed setting, we find out that in general, if existent, the potential
advantages from its introduction cannot be fairly divided among the participating
insurers. Thereby, we have to expect systematic wealth transfers between the policy-
holders of different insurance companies. We introduce a framework for utility-based
fund charges as a solution to this problem.
Zusammenfassung In diesem Artikel wird der Einfluss eines selbstragenden Kon-
kurssicherungsfonds in der Versicherungsbranche auf die Vermögenssituation der
Versicherungsnehmer in unvollständigen Märkten analysiert. Innerhalb des unter-
suchten Rahmens stellen wir fest, dass die etwaigen Vorteile, die ein solcher Fonds
mit sich bringen kann, generell nicht verursachungsgerecht alloziert werden. Dies
kann zu Vermögenstransfers zwischen den teilnehmenden Unternehmen führen. Als
Lösung wird ein nutzenbasierter Ansatz zur Pämienbemessung vorgeschlagen.
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1 Introduction
The magnitude of losses throughout the current financial crisis has even jeopardized
the existence of large financial institutions. Insolvency costs caused by the recent
turbulences in the international financial markets did not only affect equity and debt
holders, but, through the necessity of major bail-outs, also taxpayers and the whole
society. However, making taxpayers pay for corporate insolvencies is hard to justify
and might incentivize insurers to take more risks.
An insurance guaranty fund financed by all insurance companies in the market
can be employed to force insurance companies to internalize the entire industry’s
insolvency costs. Its introduction is only one of many possible approaches for the
attempt to install a controlled run-off system within the insurance sector. Neverthe-
less, since insurance companies are not homogeneous and differ in risk brought into
the insurance guaranty fund’s pool, the calculation of risk-based premiums and the
definition of possible pay-outs from the insurance guaranty fund becomes a very im-
portant task in this context. If these aspects are not considered—as typically done
in insurance practice1—one can expect adverse incentives for insurers and extensive
cross-subsidization between market participants.
The goal of this contribution is to examine under which conditions the introduction
of an insurance guaranty fund can be beneficial for policyholders. In a first step, we
suggest that, if a contingent claim approach is applied in order to value the claims of
an insurance company’s stakeholders, policyholders cannot be made better off by the
introduction of a fairly designed insurance guaranty fund. In a second step and in an
incomplete market setting, we analyze under which conditions an insurance guaranty
fund is advantageous for risk-averse policyholders. Possible diversification benefits
through the introduction of an insurance guaranty fund are measured by an increase
in the utility of the policyholders. The correlation between the fund’s payoff and the
insurer’s assets as well as the premium level in the fund turn out to be important
in order to draw benefits through the introduction of an insurance guaranty fund. If
companies are homogeneous and diversification benefits arise through the insurance
guaranty fund, the increase in utility is equally allocated to all participating policy-
holder collectives. However, we find that in the case of heterogeneous companies, an
insurance guaranty fund is in general no longer beneficial—at least not to the same
extent—for all policyholders of the different insurance companies on the market. As
a possible solution to this problem, we introduce a concept of utility-based premium
calculations within the fund.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we give an
overview of related literature. Section 3 illustrates the general setting used for the
purpose of our analysis. We analyze the conditions under which an insurance guar-
anty fund can be beneficial in a contingent claims and utility-based context in Sect. 4.
1See, e.g., Brewer-III et al. (1997), Feldhaus and Kazenski (1998), Oxera (2007).
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In Sect. 5 we discuss different premium principles in the utility-based setting. An
exemplary payoff structure for the guaranty fund is given. Finally, in Sect. 6 we sum-
marize.
2 Literature overview
A comprehensive discussion of the literature is presented in Rymaszewski et al.
(2010). In the following we point out the main references.
Cummins (1988) argues that a well designed insurance guaranty fund should de-
mand risk-based premium payments to avoid adverse incentives resulting from the
information asymmetries between the insurer and the policyholders. If the insurer is
not charged according to its risk, he may still be able to increase their market value
by raising the volatility of their assets. This problem, also denoted as the risk-subsidy
effect, is analyzed by Lee et al. (1997), who provide sound empirical evidence for its
significance within the U.S. property-liability insurance market. They do not find any
significant influence of the so-called monitoring effect, which may occur if insurers
are charged ex-post with risk-inadequate fees. In such a context, insurance companies
should have a greater incentive to monitor their competitors. This relation is closely
connected to the monitoring abilities of insurance companies and their policyholders.
If the insurers are able to monitor other insurance companies more effectively than
policyholders are capable and willing to, this effect can be expected to be crucial.
Nevertheless, a system of ex-post charges cannot be organized in a risk-based way
due to the fact that the insolvent insurance company, which may have been the riski-
est one, is typically not charged at all. This issue is extensively addressed by Han et
al. (1997, pp. 1119). Brewer-III et al. (1997) support the previous results for guar-
anty funds effectively funded by taxpayers for the U.S. life insurance market. Downs
and Sommer (1999) arrive at similar conclusions and extend their line of reasoning
by insider ownership issues. Sommer (1996) provides empirical evidence for market
discipline in the U.S. property-liability insurance market and puts it in the insurance
guaranty fund context. He argues that fund charges based on the amount of insurance
premiums earned by an insurer may even strengthen the risk-subsidy incentives.
The calculation of risk-adequate premiums is one of the most important tasks in
the context of an insurance guaranty fund. Cummins (1988) suggests a premium prin-
ciple based on option pricing theory. In his framework, assets and liabilities of the
company are modeled as diffusion processes. He interprets the value of the hedge
provided by an insurance guaranty fund as the price of a European put option on the
company’s assets with the value of liabilities as the strike. Duan and Yu (2005) ex-
tend the one-period model from Cummins (1988) into a multi-period setting. They
incorporate interest rate risk and regulatory responses mandated by risk-based capital
regulations.
3 The model framework
In this Section we describe the model framework applied within the analysis con-
ducted in Rymaszewski et al. (2010). First, a general design of the analyzed insurance
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guaranty fund is presented. Second, we depict the resulting policyholders’ wealth po-
sition. Finally, a general requirement for an insurance guaranty fund’s payoff scheme
is illustrated.
3.1 General design of the insurance guaranty fund
Consider a set C = {1, . . . ,M} of M mutual companies denoted by i = 1, . . . ,M ,
active on the market, and define W(0)i as the aggregated premium paid by the policy-
holders of the insurer i at time t = 0.
If there is no insurance guaranty fund, policyholders of the mutual i are entitled
to two stochastic stakes at time t = 1, namely the insureds’ position and the own-
ers’ stake (see Fig. 1 in Rymaszewski et al. 2010 for an overview of the relevant
cash flows). The insureds’ position, whose value in t = 1 is denoted by P˜ (1)i , grants
the policyholders coverage of their aggregated stochastic claims S˜(1)i each time the
company remains solvent, i.e., the stochastic assets A˜(1)i exceed the claims S˜
(1)
i . If
claims exceed the assets of the insurer at time t = 1, i.e. S˜(1)i > A˜(1)i , policyhold-
ers receive solely the market value of assets—in this case, the company is insolvent.
The owners’ stake, whose value in t = 1 is denoted by E˜(1)i , is determined resid-
ually by the difference between the value of the assets and the aggregated claims
at (t = 1).
If an insurance guaranty fund is introduced, the company i pays a fraction π(0)i
of the aggregated premium W(0)i into the guaranty scheme as an ex-ante charge. The
insurance guaranty fund invests this premium on the capital market. This investment
results in a stochastic cash flow π˜ (1)i at time t = 1.
At the same time, policyholders of the mutual do have claims with respect to the
insurance guaranty fund. If the mutual is insolvent, full coverage of policyholders’
claims can be provided as long as the insurance guaranty fund is solvent. If too many
insolvencies occur and not enough capital is available in the insurance guaranty fund,
only a partial coverage is possible. Let us denote P˜ (1)i as the value of the claims of the
policyholders of company i against the guaranty fund in t = 1. In addition, policy-
holders collectively enjoy an equity stake in the insurance guaranty fund. The value
of this position from the point of view of the policyholders of company i in t = 1
can be written as E˜ (1)i . Hence, the joint position of the policyholders of the company
i in the insurance guaranty fund can be written as F˜ (1)i = P˜ (1)i + E˜ (1)i . The policy-
holder’s and owner’s stakes in the insurance company i change to P˜ (1),fi and E˜
(1),f
i ,
respectively. We assume that the premium obtained from policyholders of the mutual
company i is the same with and without an insurance guaranty fund, which implies
W
(0)
i = W(0),fi .
3.2 Wealth position of the policyholder collectives
In a situation without an insurance guaranty fund, the wealth position W˜ (1)i of the
policyholder group of the mutual company i ∈ C at time t = 1 is given by the sum of
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the insureds’ position P˜ (1)i and the owners’ stake E˜
(1)
i ,
W˜
(1)
i = P˜ (1)i + E˜(1)i = A˜(1)i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,M. (1)
Thus, the joint wealth position is equivalent to a long position in company’s assets.
We abstract from any other wealth positions and risk sources the policyholders of
company i might face.
After the insurance guaranty fund is introduced and the fund premium π(0)i is
paid, the company assets decrease. In this case, the available assets at time t = 1 are
denoted by A˜(1),i = A˜(1)i − π˜ (1)i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,M . In order to simplify the analysis,
we implicitly assume that the chosen asset allocation in the insurance guaranty fund
for the respective premiums π(0)i , i = 1, . . . ,M , and in the insurance company i is
identical. With introduction of the guaranty fund, claims against the fund, P˜ (1)i , as
well as an equity stake in the fund, E˜ (1)i , arise and add up to the wealth position.
Hence, the latter is equal to
W˜
(1),f
i = P˜ (1),fi + E˜(1),fi + P˜ (1)i + E˜ (1)i = A˜(1),i + F˜ (1)i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,M. (2)
A minimal requirement on the structure of the payoff is given below in Sect. 3.3,
an exemplary payoff structure is illustrated in Sect. 5.3.
3.3 Payoff scheme of the guaranty fund
The cash flow F˜ (1)i of the insurance guaranty fund is dependent on the number
of companies M , their asset and claim distributions, A˜(1) = (A˜(1)i )i∈C and S˜(1) =
(S˜
(1)
i )i∈C , the correlation structures between assets and claims, as well as the premi-
ums charged by the fund, (0) = (π(0)i )i∈C , and their stochastic distribution at time
t = 1, ˜(1).
In order to ensure proper incentives, the minimal requirement on the obligatory
insurance guaranty fund is that it has to be self-supporting, i.e., at time t = 1, the
sum for all companies of the expected fund payoff equals the sum of the expected
premiums collected by the fund:
∑
i∈C
〈
F˜
(1)
i
〉 =
∑
i∈C
〈
π˜
(1)
i
〉
. (3)
This implies that, e.g., there is no external agent (e.g., taxpayer) that would have
to cover a part of the default risk through (contingent) payments to the fund. Since
the guaranty fund is required to be self-supporting, the derivation of an adequate
structure for the payoff scheme is strongly determined. However, in general, various
schemes can be derived, thereby implying different incentives for the market partici-
pants.
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4 Evaluation of the insurance guaranty fund
4.1 Contingent claims approach
If PV[F˜ (1)i ] = π(0)i , the present value of the policyholders’ claims with respect to the
fund equals the initial contribution, hence PV[W˜ (1)i ] = PV[W˜ (1),fi ]. This condition is
fulfilled in an arbitrage-free market. Otherwise systematic wealth transfers between
different insurers would take place.
The safety level of an insurer changes ceteris paribus with the contribution π(0)i
in the fund. In addition, an agreed payoff scheme that defines the conditions under
which payouts are made from the fund to the insurance companies will influence
the distributions of P˜ (1)i and E˜ (1)i . For instance, the probability that claims can be
paid from the two sources (the insurer and the guaranty fund) will depend on the
design of the payoff scheme and the premium payments in the fund. However, as
long as the stakes are priced fairly, in this model setup the policyholders face neither
an advantage nor disadvantage.
This situation may change, if the ability to diversify varies among distinct market
participants. It can be the case in incomplete markets (see, e.g., Cochrane 2005),
where investors cannot replicate all possible future cash flows. In general, one may
assume that insurance companies and insurance guaranty funds are able to diversify
in a better way than policyholders. If this is the case, the potential pooling effect of
an insurance guaranty fund may enhance policyholders’ wealth position and hence
become one of the advantages in favor of its introduction. In such a setup, in order to
value the diverse stakes, assumptions about the investors’ preferences are needed.
4.2 A utility-based approach
4.2.1 Policyholders’ utility function
Let us assume that the policyholder collective’s utility for companies i = 1, . . . ,M ,
at time t = 1 is described by the standard mean-variance utility function of their re-
spective stochastic wealth position. In the setup without insurance guaranty fund, the
wealth position of the policyholders of company i, W˜ (1)i , is given by (1), and we intro-
duce the corresponding utility φ(1)i = 〈W˜ (1)i 〉− ai2 var(W˜ (1)i ), where ai defines the risk
aversion parameter. Similarly, in the setting with the fund and based on the stochastic
wealth position of the policyholders W˜ (1),fi , introduced in (2), we introduce the utility
defined by φ(1),fi = 〈W˜ (1),fi 〉 − ai2 var(W˜ (1),fi ). The absolute change in policyholders’
utility in company i due to the introduction of the guaranty fund, is denoted by
aφ
(1)
i = φ(1),fi − φ(1)i
= 〈F˜ (1)i − π˜ (1)i
〉 − ai
2
[
var
(
F˜
(1)
i − π˜ (1)i
) + 2cov(A˜(1)i , F˜ (1)i − π˜ (1)i
)]
. (4)
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4.2.2 Risk-neutral investors
If the policyholder collective of company j is assimilated to a risk-neutral investor,
who by definition does not adjust for risk while making its financial decisions, it
would be indifferent between both setups, without or with the guaranty fund, if
φ
(1)
j = φ(1),fj . This condition implies that aφ(1)j != 0. Since in this case we have
aj = 0, we get from (4):
aφ
(1)
j =
〈
F˜
(1)
j − π˜ (1)j
〉 != 0 ⇐⇒ 〈F˜ (1)j
〉 = 〈π˜ (1)j
〉
. (5)
We conclude that the condition φ(1)j = φ(1),fj is fulfilled if and only if 〈F˜ (1)j 〉 = 〈π˜ (1)j 〉.
Since the guaranty fund is supposed to be self-supporting (3), Condition (5) is al-
ways accounted for on an aggregated level. Hence, if all investors are risk-neutral,
there is no possibility to achieve a utility-based Pareto enhancement by introducing
an insurance guaranty fund. In fact, in a self-supporting fund, violating Condition (5)
for some company, can improve the expected value of the mutual stake in one insurer
only by (negatively) influencing at least some of the expected values of the policy-
holders’ payoff of the remaining companies. This means that in such a case some
policyholders can benefit solely from the costs of other insureds.
4.2.3 Risk-averse policyholders
In what follows, we assume risk-averse policyholders, i.e. ai > 0, ∀i ∈ C , and analyze
potential benefits from the existence of an insurance guaranty fund by an analysis of
the (absolute) change in utility aφ(1)i .
Pooling of claims in an insurance guaranty fund is beneficial from the perspective
of the policyholders of the mutual insurer i if
aφ
(1)
i > 0 ⇐⇒
〈
F˜
(1)
i − π˜ (1)i
〉 + ai
[
cov
(
A˜
(1)
i , π˜
(1)
i
) + cov(F˜ (1)i , π˜ (1)i
)
− cov(F˜ (1)i , A˜(1)i
) − 1
2
var
(
F˜
(1)
i
) − 1
2
var
(
π˜
(1)
i
)]
> 0. (6)
An interesting insight is that Condition (6) cannot be fulfilled whenever both the
insurance company and the fund are investing only in risk-free assets. In this case all
covariances in (6) are equal to zero. Hence, if 〈F˜ (1)i 〉 = 〈π˜ (1)i 〉, we get aφ(1)i ≤ 0. In
order to achieve diversification, a positive asset return volatility is needed. Risk-free
investments make the wealth position of the policyholders (see (1)) deterministic. An
insurance guaranty fund leads to a positive volatility of the wealth position. Moreover,
if 〈F˜ (1)i 〉 = 〈π˜ (1)i 〉, its expected value is unchanged. This is strictly a disadvantage for
risk-averse policyholders.
Since (6) contains the (complex) relationship between F˜ (1)i and the asset A˜(1),
claim S˜(1), and premium distributions ˜(1) of all companies, an explicit derivation of
necessary conditions for a positive diversification benefit is not practicable without
loss of generality.
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Finally, let us point out that the changes in utility implied by the existing guaranty
funds are not, in general, identical for all market players. Since most of the exist-
ing national guaranty funds charge premiums based on companies’ premium income
(e.g., USA, UK, France), or their net technical reserves (e.g., Germany), this neither
guarantees that the fund is self-supporting, as we require in (3), nor that different pol-
icyholder groups profit from an equal utility increase caused by the existence of the
guaranty fund, as we discuss in Sect. 5.
5 Premium principles and payoff
The payoff distribution F˜ (1)i is strongly influenced by the premium principle used to
derive π(0)i , i ∈ C . As we assume that the insurer and the insurance guaranty fund
choose the same fixed risky asset allocation, an increase in fund premium payments
π
(0)
i will result in an increase of var(π˜
(1)
i ). All elements in (6) would be influenced by
an alteration of π(0)i . Hence, for the policyholders of the insurer i with a specific risk
aversion parameter ai > 0, there may exist a premium range where Inequality (6) is
fulfilled. This premium range depends on the asset and claim distributions as well as
their correlations between all insurers. In other words, we may calculate a premium
π
(0)
i that would set the policyholder’s utility to a given level. Since premium lev-
els are directly linked to the safety level (ruin probability, expected shortfall) of the
companies, charged premiums are bounded from above by in-force solvency regula-
tions (e.g. Solvency II, Swiss Solvency Test). Furthermore, the effect of the premium
level on the diversification benefit and the augmentation of the safety level in case the
guaranty fund is introduced have to be analyzed carefully.
5.1 “Fair” premiums in the general case
Whenever homogeneous companies are charged different premiums, or in the case of
heterogeneous companies, the premium principle 〈F˜ (1)i 〉 = 〈π˜ (1)i 〉 does no more hold
in general for any i ∈ C . Let us assume that we are able to find premiums (0) such
that the 〈F˜ (1)i 〉 = 〈π˜ (1)i 〉,∀i ∈ C . Even if all pooling participants are characterized by
the same level of risk aversion ai > 0, the effect of pooling is different for every par-
ticipating insurer. This is due to diverging distributions of assets and claims as well
as to the different correlation structure between those variables. In general, some pol-
icyholder collectives can be worse off after the introduction of an insurance guaranty
fund. Even when all policyholders of all companies would benefit from an insurance
guaranty fund (in this case, Inequality (6) would be fulfilled for all participants), the
utility increase would in general differ among companies. This finding is intensified
if, for example, different policyholder collectives valuate their own wealth positions
according to different utility functions.
Using some kind of risk-based premium principle based on the loss distribution
(S˜(1)i − A˜(1)i ) of the insurer i would not change our general line of reasoning. In
this case, it again cannot be excluded that some companies will (and other will not)
benefit from an insurance guaranty fund. We believe that, in an incomplete market,
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a non-arbitrary way of allocating the existing diversification benefits back to the
pool participants via a particular premium principle is not possible, since we face
a problem that is similar to the capital allocation dilemma that the academic liter-
ature has extensively discussed in the last few years (cf., e.g., Phillips et al. 1998;
Myers and Read 2001; Sherris 2006; Gründl and Schmeiser 2007). Hence, the postu-
late of an insurance guaranty fund charging premiums that should be fair according to
the risk born by an insurer leads in general to some form of a utility transfer between
the insurance companies pooled in the insurance guaranty fund. Such a transfer may
under certain conditions be justified, if, e.g., the proposed guaranty fund leads to a
considerable reduction of agency problems as described in Sect. 2.
5.2 Utility-based premiums in the general case
As stated above, the benefits of pooling claims within an insurance guaranty fund
may differ widely among participants. Beside the used premium principle, the poten-
tial advantages or disadvantages from pooling are closely tied to the portfolio compo-
sition of the insurer as well as the fund. One of possible ways to derive the insurance
guaranty fund premium is the premium calculation based on the individual utility of
the participating policyholder collectives. More precisely, we could demand a pre-
mium calculation for all M companies that leads to an equal utility increase for all
M participants. Such a calculation is possible, if for each company i ∈ C there exists
a premium π(0)i —accounting for the available amount of assets A
(0)
i and solvency
regulations in force—such that the preset (non-zero) utility increase can be reached.
When the payoff structure for the guaranty fund is defined, as, e.g., given in
Sect. 5.3, the change in utility in t = 1, aφ(1)i (see (4)), from the setup without
to the one with an insurance guaranty fund can be calculated for all companies i ∈ C
with given preferences ai . The utility states φ(1)i and φ
(1),f
i , as well as the change in
utility aφ(1)i are considered here as function of the premiums π
(0)
i charged from all
companies: φ(1)i = φ(1)i ((0)), φ(1),fi = φ(1),fi ((0)), aφ(1)i = aφ(1)i ((0)).
We can evaluate the set SK of possible premium combinations (0) for given
utility change parameter K ∈ R, by the following procedure of finding
Premiums (0) = (π(0)i
)
i∈C such that aφ
(1)
i (
(0)) = K, ∀i ∈ C. (7)
Depending on the magnitude of the parameter K this procedure yields a set of pre-
mium combinations (0) such that the overall (absolute) change in utility aφ(1)i
is equal for all participants (premium principle). An optimization calculus can de-
fine the premium combination such that the change in utility is maximized, i.e.
the maximum of K such that there exists a solution (0) ∈ SK . Numerical ex-
amples for the application of the utility-based premium principle can be found in
Rymaszewski et al. (2010).
5.3 An exemplary payoff structure
The exemplary payoff scheme for an insurance guaranty fund formally derived by
Rymaszewski et al. (2010) is not only proven to be self-supporting, i.e., to fulfill
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Fig. 1 Contingent payoff F˜ (1)
i
from the insurance guaranty fund (IGF) to the insurer. See Rymaszewski
et al. (2010) for a formal illustration
Condition (3), but is also intended to establish desirable incentives for the partici-
pating insurers. Consult Fig. 1, for a summary of the payoff structure contingent on
the situation of the insurer and the insurance guaranty fund. In general, a chance for
premium refund to solvent companies in case the insurance guaranty fund does not
go bankrupt can encourage the companies to limit not only their own risk, but also to
monitor their rivals. Moreover, the issue of insurance companies which went bankrupt
solely due to the existence of an insurance guaranty fund should be adequately ad-
dressed within the payoff scheme in order to reduce potential resistance against its
introduction.
5.4 Particular case of homogeneous companies charged identical premiums
In the case where all M companies on the market are homogeneous, and are charged
an identical premium π(0)—as they should be if we aim at charging risk-adjusted
premiums—, we have 〈F˜ (1)i 〉 = 〈π˜ (1)〉, ∀i ∈ C . If their policyholders have the same
positive risk-aversion parameters ai = a > 0, whenever this premium π(0) goes along
with a fulfillment of Inequality (6), all groups of policyholders are better off to the
same extent (compared to the situation without an insurance guaranty fund). Ry-
maszewski et al. (2010) illustrate this effect by means of a numerical example.
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6 Summary
The contingent claim approach is often suggested in the literature as an approach
to derive risk-based premiums, which should be charged by an insurance guaranty
fund for the protection it offers against insurers’ insolvencies. However, we make the
point that within complete markets, the introduction of such an insurance guaranty
fund cannot improve the wealth position of the policyholders if all stakes are priced
fairly. If we abandon the assumption of a complete market, we also show that risk-
neutral investors cannot be made better off through the existence of a self-supporting
insurance guaranty fund. Hence, if the roll-out of a self-supporting insurance guar-
anty fund implies transaction costs, its introduction is detrimental to the insureds in
both cases.
Matters may change in the more likely case of risk-averse investors and incomplete
markets. The potential diversification benefit, which might be achieved by pooling
claims in an insurance guaranty fund, may improve insureds’ wealth position. How-
ever, a diversification advantage (or disadvantage) measured through the increase in
policyholders’ utility, is only equal for every single insurer if companies are homo-
geneous, exhibit the same utility function, and an identical degree of risk aversion.
The problem of allocating possible diversification benefits attained in an insurance
guaranty fund back to heterogeneous insurance companies in an incomplete mar-
ket setting with risk-averse policyholders is similar to the capital allocation problem
widely discussed in the academic literature within the last couple of years. Following
this line of reasoning, no non-arbitrary allocation of the collective premium within
an insurance guaranty fund back to the different insurance companies is possible
if the conditions of a complete market are not fulfilled. Different premium principles
used to derive the fund charges (for instance, based on the individual risk profile of an
insurer) lead, in general, to a situation in which policyholders are treated unequally—
in the sense of a utility increase—through the introduction of an insurance guaranty
fund. Even if each policyholder enjoys a diversification benefit, some insureds will be
better off than others. To counteract this effect, we introduce the concept of a utility-
based premium calculation principle to derive charges for an insurance guaranty fund
and discuss its implications within the insurance market.
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